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Abstract— Over the past few years, Cognitive Radio (CR) has 
been considered as a demanding concept for improving the 
utilization of limited radio spectrum resources for future wireless 
communications and mobile computing. Since a member of 
Cognitive Radio Networks may join or leave the network at any 
time, the issue of supporting secure communication in CRNs 
becomes more critical than for the other conventional wireless 
networks. This work thus proposes a secure trust-based 
authentication approach for CRNs. A CR node’s trust value is 
determined from its previous trust behavior in the network and 
depending on this trust value, it is decided whether or not this 
CR node will obtain access to the Primary User’s free spectrum. 
The security analysis is performed to guarantee that the 
proposed approach achieves security proof.    
Keywords-Trust; primary user; secondary user; authentication; 
secure; cognitive radio networks; raio. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the rapid development of wireless applications, 
Cognitive Radio (CR) has offered a promising concept for 
improving the consumption of limited radio spectrum resources 
for future wireless communications and mobile computing.  
The primary objective of Cognitive Radio Networks is to scan 
the spectral band and identity free channels which will be used 
for opportunistic transmission. Sometimes, several frequency 
bands are not used according to their maximum level. These 
under-utilized areas are known as spectrum holes or white 
spaces [1]. So, CRs offer a solution for the scarcity of spectrum 
by reusing the under-utilized spectrum. National regulatory 
bodies like the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
assign spectrum for particular types of services that are then 
licensed to bidders for a fee [2]. CR pioneered by Mitola [3] 
from software defined radio (SDR) was originally considered 
to improve spectrum utilization. CR, on the other hand, sits 
above the SDR and is the “intelligence” that lets an SDR 
determine which mode of operation and parameters to use. We 
can obtain an overview of CR functionalities from Haykins’s 
definition of cognitive radio [4]: “Cognitive radio is an 
intelligent wireless communication system that is aware of its 
surrounding environment (i.e., outside world), and uses the 
methodology of understandings-by-building to learn from the 
environment and adapt its internal states to statistical variations 
in the incoming RF stimuli by making corresponding changes 
in certain operating parameters (e.g., transmit power, carries-
frequency, and modulation strategy) in real time, with two 
primary objectives in mind: highly reliable communication 
whenever and wherever needed, efficient utilization of the 
radio spectrum”. CR has two main properties: Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) and Dynamic Spectrum Access (DNS) [5]. AI 
involves reasoning and learning. This gives CR its ‘intelligent’ 
characteristics and allows it to learn about its changing 
environment. DNS is the processes involved in getting a CR to 
detect and occupy a vacant spectrum. It involves spectrum 
sensing, spectrum management, spectrum mobility and 
spectrum sharing [5]. The Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) 
consist of various kinds of communication systems and 
networks, and can be viewed as heterogeneous networks. There 
are two broad classes of users in CR: the primary user (PU) is a 
licensed user of a particular radio frequency band and the 
secondary user (SU) is an unlicensed user who cognitively 
operates without causing harmful interference to the primary 
user [6]. Since cognitive radios can adapt to their environment 
and change how they communicate, it is crucial that they select 
optimal and secure means of communication. Cognitive radio 
networks operate on wireless media. Compared to wired a 
network, the nature of a wireless network makes the security 
vulnerability unavoidable. In a wireless network, the signal has 
to be transmitted through an open media without real 
connection. That is to say, the data might be eavesdropped and 
altered without notice; and the channel might be jammed and 
overused by an adversary [7]. In addition, the unique 
characteristics of CRNs make security more challenging. Still, 
there are some crucial issues which have not yet been 
investigated in the area of security for cognitive radio 
networks. When a CR node initially tries to form a CRN or 
tries to connect a node to join an existing CRN, it is practically 
impossible to implement conventional security functions as 
CRNs have resource constraints such as power and memory. A 
typical public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme which achieves 
secure routing and other purposes in typical ad-hoc networks is 
not enough to guarantee the security of CRNs, given their 
limited communication and computation resources. Therefore, 
a trusted mechanism is necessary in CRNs, while 
authentication is a part of trust along with other technical or 
non-technical factors. To ensure smooth operation of CRN to 
support ubiquitous computing, trust forms the foundation of 
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security platform of CRNs. However, trust for CRNs is quite 
different from that of other wireless scenarios and of other 
areas of computing trust. Trust is critical in CRN operation and 
is beyond security design since security usually needs 
communication overhead advance. So in this paper, we propose 
a trust-based authentication mechanism for secure 
communication in cognitive radio networks. 
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, related 
works is reviewed. In Section 3, our proposed scheme is 
described. In Section 4, we show the security proofs of our 
proposed scheme. We conclude the paper in Section 5 
including remarks on future directions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
To ensure the smooth operation of CRNs in supporting 
ubiquitous computing, the establishment of trust for CRNs is 
an open and challenging issue. Trust has been widely 
mentioned in the existing literatures in relation to trusted 
computing and web computing, ad hoc networks and even 
social science [8]. However, trust in terms of CRNs is 
completely different from all of these other scenarios. Trust is 
critical to CRN operation and beyond security design, as 
security usually needs communication overhead in advance. 
The authors [9] describe the trust in CRN as an essential part of 
the following phases: 
 A cognitive radio senses a spectrum hole and, to 
dynamically access the spectrum for transmission, 
requires “trust” from the originally existing system (i.e. 
primary system) and regulator, even without creating 
interference to PS. 
 A cognitive radio may want to leverage another 
existing cognitive radio to route its packets, even 
though another CR is not the targeted recipient 
terminal. It requires “trust” from another CR. 
 A cognitive radio can even leverage PS to forward its 
packets to realize the goal of packet switching 
networks. It needs “trust” from the PS, not only at 
network level but also in service provider  
A Markov chain-based trust model has been proposed for 
analyzing trust value in distributed multicasting mobile ad hoc 
networks [10]. They also proposed the approach for selecting 
the Certificate Authority (CA) and Backup CA (BCA) [10].   
The impact of trust model in CRNs is discussed briefly in [11]. 
The authors in [12] integrated trust and reputation for the threat 
mitigation of Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) 
attack on CRNs.  However, they did not propose any trust 
modeling for CRNs. The authors suggested potential ways for 
incorporating trust modeling to CRNs including identity 
management, the trust building process and possible 
mechanisms for disseminating the trust information [11]. 
Furthermore, no experimental results were established for these 
discussions. A trust-aware model was proposed for spectrum 
sensing in CRNs but the authors failed to evaluate the system 
[13]. A Trust Value Updated Model (TVUM) is proposed in 
layered and grouped ad hoc networks for ensuring the 
authentication [14].  In this paper, we propose a trust-based 
authentication mechanism for secure communication in CRNs. 
We also propose the trust table update procedure when one 
new CR node wants to join the network or leave the network. 
Here we discuss how this joining and leaving event impacts on 
the trust table in CRNs. 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME  
Trust and Security in Cognitive Radio Networks are always 
interlinked. They complement each other and are mutually 




Figure 1.  Trust and Security Relation in CRNs. 
Whenever a CR node turns on, there will be many available 
access networks around it. Here, available access networks are 
those networks which are able to obtain authorization to use 
their network resources. In order to be authorized to obtain 
network resources and then services, the CR node should first 
be trusted [9]. So, trust is the foundation to ensure smooth and 















Figure 2. Security Components in CRNs. 
Whenever one SU (Secondary User) wants to use a PU’s 
free spectrum, the PU needs to check the authenticity of this 
Secondary User for security purposes by using trust.  So, the 
aim of this paper is to propose a trust-based authentication 
scheme for secure communication in CRNs. The system 











Figure 3. System Architecture of Proposed Scheme 
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In the system architecture, primary users and secondary 
users are deployed in one geographical area. PUs are connected 
to PUBS (Primary User Base Station) and SUs are connected to 
SUBS (Secondary User Base Station). Both PUBS and SUBS 
are connected to a CA (Certificate Authority). In network 
security, the third party, known as the Certificate Authority 
(CA), always achieves secure authentication [10] . So the SUs 
and PUs are connected to the CA via SUBS and PUBS 
respectively. Whenever one SU searches a PU’s free available 
spectrum, the PU is connected to the CA to see the trust value 
of the requested secondary user. Then the PU calculates the 
trust value based on the previous interaction of the SU and 




















Figure 4. System Model of Proposed Scheme 
In our proposed model, whenever the SU wants to use the 
PU’s free spectrum, at first the PU needs to check the SU’s 
trust value for security purpose. Both SUBS and PUBS are 
connected to the CA which has a trust repository that contains 
the trust value of every CR node. In the trust repository, there 
are two values about one node’s trust: one is Public value 
which is visible to every node in the network. Another one is 
Private value only for the CA to access that value. This value is 
actually preserved for security purposes. If there is any hacker 
or attacker in the network and they intentionally alter the trust 
value, then the CA can check the private value of trust and 
obtain information about which node has been attacked. Then 
the CA broadcasts one message to revoke the hacked node 
from the network. Actually, we have proposed this trust 
repository concept to check the trust value in order to ensure 
secure communication. 
When one SU tries to access one PU’s free spectrum, the 
PUBS at first checks the SU’s trust value from the CA’s trust 
repository. If the value is greater than the predefined threshold, 
then the PUBS assigns free spectrum to the requested SU.  If 
this is not the case, then the PUBS checks the reference trust 
value with which the secondary user already has a connection. 
The PUBS computes the average of the reference values of the 
trust value and checks the trust value. If it is not an acceptable 
trust value, then the PUBS declines the request. But if a new 
node wants to access the Primary user’s free spectrum, at first 
the joining node should meet the agreement with the Base 
station. The SUBS, PUBS as well as the member nodes assign 
the trust value to the new joining node by seeing its past reports 
after the completion of the joining process which is described 
later in our proposed approach. Then, the PUBS checks its trust 
value for the spectrum access. 
We assume that a node with high trust performances results 
in a high trust value. The trust value ( )TV ji denotes the trust 
value of node j evaluated by node i. The average trust value of 
















TV jin iTV ji
RR
                 (2) 
is the trust value of CR node j evaluated by node i of the 
nth evaluation,  N is the number of computations and RR is the 
number of receivers in network radius. The higher the trust 
performance that a CR node executes, the higher is the average 
trust value that the CR node generates[10].  Our proposed 
model consists of three steps: 
1. Creating the trust relationship and Selecting the 
CA among CR nodes 
2. Defining trust level when one new CR node joins 
to the network and 
3. Defining the trust level when one node leaves the 
network 
Step 1: Creating the trust relationship and Selecting the CA 
among CR nodes 
A CR member node’s trust value represents its trust 
manner in the CRN. A CR node with good manners, such as 
vacating the PU’s spectrum band on its arrival, normal joining 
to the CRN or leaving the CRN, enough residual power and 
enough bandwidth, will obtain a high trust value. An example 
of determining CR node’s trust values after exchanging 
individual evaluated trust values among CR nodes is shown in 
Table 1. The trust table is stored in the CA node. Every node 















TABLE I.  TRUST RELATIONSHIP TABLE 
Node, i 1
( )N i , j jTVi  

















































TABLE II.  LOCAL RELATIONSHIP TABLE 
Node, 
i 












As referred by [10] we calculate the trust value of every 
member nodes in CRN and select the CA. Each CR node is 
aware of its 1-hop neighbor nodes. The 1-hop neighbor of node 
i is denoted by ( )lN i . For instance, CR node PU1’s 1-hop 
neighbors, 1 ( 1)N PU , are CR nodes SU2, SU3 and SU1. Node 
SU3’s trust value evaluated by PU1 is denoted by  31
SU
PUTV = 4. 
Different nodes evaluate the same node’s trust value and may 
have different results because of its findings and experiences. 
Each node’s trust value including both PU’s and SU’s trust 
value is stored in the CA node which is indicated in table 1. 
From this table, the average trust value of each node is 
calculated and stored in CA which is indicated in Table 2.  The 






                                     (3) 
where  T is the whole Network and j is the number of 
nodes that evaluate i’s trust value. 
Whenever the SU searches the PU’s free spectrum, at first 
the PU accesses the CA’s trust table. From the CA’s trust table, 
the PU obtains the average trust value of the requesting SU. 
Depending on the trust value, the PU makes the decision of 
whether or not the SU can access the free spectrum. In our 
proposed approach, we are using the highest trust value for the 
selection of the CA. The second highest trust value will be 
selected for the selection of 1st Backup CA.  And the third 
highest trust value for the 2nd Backup of CA as well. In Figure 
6, it is depicted that the higher the trust value, the higher 
chance to be selected as CA. The second highest trusted value 
node will be selected as back up CA (BCA).  But the CA is 
selected from the Primary CR node. If the CA is detected as 
malicious or is attacked by any hacker, then the backup CA 
(BCA) will take the role of CA. In our proposed approach, the 
highest trust value node of the network will be selected as the 
CA node to authenticate and authorize the other CR group 
members. We define the number of times a CR node acted as a 
CA (NCA) or a Backup CA (NBCA) to justify the trust 
performance of each node.  So if a node has higher trust value, 





1,node j is selected as the CA
NCA j
n




1,node j is selected as the backup CA
NBCA j
n
            (5) 
But if there are several members with the same trust value, they 
will compete for the CA election according to the following 
rules [10]: 
 Priority 1: The member is current CA node. 
 Priority 2: The member is current BCA. 
CA Candidate 
1st Back Up CA 
Candidate 
2nd Back Up CA 
Candidate 
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The member, who first meets the higher priority rule, will be 
elected as CA/BCA.  
BCA Competition:  
If a node wins the BCA competition and not the current BCA 
or CA, its trust value will be incremented by one. On the 
contrary, if a BCA or CA node loses the BCA competition; its 
trust value will be decremented by one.  
CA Competition: 
If a node successfully wins the competition and not the current 
CA, its trust value will be incremented by two. Specifically, the 
CA node is responsible to manage the authority and 
authentication processes within the Cognitive Radio Network 
group.  The CA should have always the highest trust value. If a 
CA node fails to win the CA competition, its trust value will be 



























Figure 6.   CA and BCA Selection Based on Trust Value  
 
Step 2: Defining trust level when one new CR node joins to the 
network 
If a normal new node wants to join the CRN just by 
broadcasting a message to the network, this is considered as a 
normal joining event. For normal joining, the trust value for the 
new node is incremented by one.  If the new node sends many 
messages in order to join the network, this is an abnormal 
joining event as the broadcasting of numerous messages will 
break down the normal network activity. For the abnormal 
joining event, the trust value is decremented by one.  The 


















If the same result ?
Yes





Figure 7.   New Node’s Joining Process Flowchart. 
Whenever the new CR node wants to join the CRN, it 
should be authenticated by all the trusted nodes.  In order to 
explain the authentication process, we define the following  
symbols: 
New node’s Certificate: CN  
Random Number generated by new node: NR  
Base Station’s Certificate: BSC  
 Random Number generated by new node: BSR  
Numerical signature of Base Station to message:             
( )S JOINBS  
Numerical signature of New Node to message:             
( )NS JOIN  
For passing the authentication procedure for joining the 
CRNs, the following steps are followed by the new node: 
1. New Node                             C RN N  
The new node broadcasts its Certificate and 
Random Number to all member nodes in the 
network as well as to its base station.  
2. The base station and the member nodes verify the 
validity of the new node’s certificate. The base 
station produces random number BSR , calculates 
the signature to NR .  
Broadcast 
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        Base    Station                         ( )C R S RNBS BS BS   
3. New node verifies the validity of Base Station’s 
certificate BSC and calculates numerical signature 
( )S RNBS for RN and other member nodes also 
verify the numerical signature to RN . 
       New Node                             ( )BSNS R  
4. Base station and other member nodes verify the 
numerical signature to RBS and broadcast the 
result which informs the new node can be passed 
or not. 
5. If the result from the Base station node and the 
member nodes is the same, the new node passes 
the authentication process. And the trust value of 
the node is incremented by one which is shown in 
the table. 
TABLE III.  MANNER-BASED EVENT TABLE 
Good Manners          Trust Bad Manners               Trust 
Normal Leaving            +1 Abnormal Leaving         -1 
Normal Joining             +1 Abnormal Joining            -1 
 
 
Step 3: Defining the trust level when one node leaves the 
network 
If a member sends a message to the Base station before 
leaving the network, this is marked as a normal leaving event 
and the trust value of the leaving member is incremented by 
one. If the member leaves the network without sending any 
prior message, this is an abnormal leaving event. If the 
abnormal leaving event occurs, the member’s trust value will 
be decremented by one as depicted in Table III. 
We can describe the normal leaving event [14] in the 
following ways: 
1. If the leaving node is either the PUBS or SUBS, 
the new Base Station will be selected by the 
election procedure from the member nodes based 
on trust. Then the new Base Station broadcasts its 
identity and produces a new shared group key 
which is distributed to all other members. 
2. If the leaving node is a normal member node, then 
the Base Station sends a message to all members 
to stop communication with the leaving node. The 
Base Station produces a new group key and 
distributes it to all members so that the leaving 
node cannot obtain any information later. Hence, 
backward security is guaranteed here in this way. 
3. If the CA is a leaving node, then the Backup CA 
will take the role of CA. Then the new CA 
produces a new group shared key which is 
distributed to all Base Stations and other member 
nodes. 
IV. SECURITY PROOFS 
The proposed scheme is secure as long as no malicious 
entity is able to gain access to the CRN. The following services 
ensure the security proofs of our proposed scheme: 
A. Authentication 
This service provides the assurance that the requesting 
entity is the one that it claims to be. We propose authentication 
by establishing trust value of every CR node which is stored by 
the CA. Whenever a SU wants to access the PU’s free 
spectrum band, the SU shows its good manners in order to gain 
spectrum access. Then the PU accesses the trust table from the 
CA and then the PU makes the decision of whether or not the 
SU can have access to the free spectrum. So we propose a 
trust-based authentication scheme for secure communication in 
CRN. 
B. Availability 
This service ensures that the desired system or system 
resources are accessible and usable upon demand by an 
authorized entity, according to the performance specification 
for the system [9]. We propose availability here by establishing 
a first backup of CA and a second backup of CA. The trust 
table which contains the trust information for every node is 
stored with the CA. So, in our proposed approach, the CA is 
executing a major role. If the CA becomes malicious or is 
attacked by any hacker, then the first CA backup will take on 
the role of the main CA. In such a case, the backup CA 
assumes the role of Primary CA.  From amongst the available 
nodes, based on their trust value and reputation, a backup CA 
is chosen. So in our proposed approach, we are ensuring the 
service availability in terms of security.  
C. Non-repudiation 
This service provides protection against denial by one of 
the entities involved in a communication of having participated 
in all or part of the communication [9]. In our proposed 
scheme, when one new CR node wants to join and another 
leaves the network, the shared key is securely transmitted to the 
new entity and revoked from the leaving entity. The security is 
ensured here by secure joining of the network or leaving from 
the network. If the CR node maintains the normal joining or 
leaving event, the trust value is incremented by one which 
ensures the security purpose. If the CR node’s joining or 
leaving appears to be an abnormal event, the trust value is 
decremented by one which indicates that the CR node might be 
a malicious entity.  
D. Access Control 
This service prevents the unauthorized use of resources [9].  
In our proposed scheme, the authenticity is ensured by 
checking the trust value in the CA. So, if one CR node has a 





E. Dara Integrity 
This service provides the assurance that data received are 
exactly as sent by an authorized entity. In our proposed 
scheme, we are using the trust table in the CA in two formats. 
One is Public which could be accessed by any CR member in 
the network, and the other one is Private. Only the CA has 
access to the Private part of the trust table. The CA always 
compares the private trust value with the public trust value. If 
any anomaly is evident, then the CR node whose trust value is 
changed, or by whom the trust value is changed, is detected as 
a malicious node.  Later on, the malicious nodes are listed in 
the blacklist and their own trust value is decremented as well. 
V.  NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, as referred by [10], we examine the number 
of time a CR node acted as a CA (namely NCA) and a BCA 
(namely NBCA) and the number of rejects (NREJ) by Matlab 
simulation. From Figure 8, we can see that nodes 1, 3,8,12 who 
have highest average trust value, they have the higher NCA 
and less NREJ. On the contrary, the nodes 0, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 
14, 17 who have the lowest average trust value, they have the 
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Figure 8.  NCA, NBCA, NREJ, and Average Trust Value of Cognitive 
Radio Nodes.  
From Figure 8, we can realize that a node with higher 
average trust value has high NCA, NBCA and lower NREJ, 
and vice versa. 
Trust and security is closely related-this theme is depicted 
in Figure 9 (a) and 9 (b).  
From Figure 9 (a), we see that at the beginning the 
cognitive radio node has less information about other nodes. So 
the node does not have much trust value at the starting. That’s 
why the security level is very low at the beginning of 
communication. As time goes on, the node increases its 
communication with other nodes by using previous experiences 
and references, so the trust value increases. As trust value 
increases, the security level also starts to increase.  
Figure 9 (b) shows the case where all the cognitive nodes 
are in a good condition at the beginning. The nodes have high 
trust values with others. So, the security level is above on the 
expectation level at the beginning.  When the network is 
running, some nodes are comprised because of various attacks 
and lack of energy. These situations make the security level 

























Figure 9 (b).  Security Level Started above Expectation Level 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In cognitive radio networks, some non-compliant Cognitive 
Radio users may create interference by accessing the primary 
user’s available spectrum band. Such malicious users can 
seriously damage the whole network performance possibly 
resulting in the collapse of the CRN. It is critical to consider 
that Cognitive Radio Networks operate under resource 
constraints. As CRNs have dynamic hebaviours, members of 
Cognitive Radio Networks may join or leave the network at 
any time. Hence, the issue of secure communication in CRNs 
becomes more important than for the other conventional 
wireless networks. Therefore, in this paper we propose a trust-
based authentication scheme for secure communication in 
CRNs. This secure authentication reduces the relative 
calculating overheads and communication cost. This work 
thus proposes a secure trust-based authentication approach for 
CRNs. Moreover, we propose security proof of our proposed 
scheme. In this paper, we do not deal with the biasing between 
the CA and other nodes, so the some specific node’s trust 
value will always be higher. In future work, we will focus on 
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